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PREVENTIVE DETENTION DISTORTED:
WHY IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
TO DETAIN IMMIGRANTS WITHOUT
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS
Whitney Chelgren*
There are two main problems with the current immigration detention
system: the conditions of confinement and the procedural mechanisms
that are used to detain noncitizens. The current conditions of
confinement cast serious doubt on the constitutionality of the detention
system. Although it is purportedly civil, immigration detention is very
much a punitive institution. Moreover, there is no binding regulation
governing the operation of detention facilities or the conduct of
detention staff. The problems that stem from this lack of regulatory
oversight are compounded by the fact that many detention centers are
run as for-profit businesses. More fundamentally, noncitizens are
detained without the procedural protections that inhere in all other
preventive detention contexts. Because there is no principled
justification for this aberration, the constitutionality of the detention
system is, at best, highly suspect. At a minimum, immigrants should
receive pre-detention hearings to determine whether their detention is
in the government’s interest, and there should be time constraints
imposed on pre-removal order detention.
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[D]ue process requires that the nature and duration of
commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose
for which the individual is committed.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, Mr. Vinodbhai Bholidas Patel left India and started a
life in the United States.2 He lived and worked in St. Louis, Missouri,
where he opened several businesses, including doughnut-shop
franchises, bagel shops, and hotels.3 In 1990, Mr. Patel became a
lawful permanent resident,4 and in 1996, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) approved his application for
naturalization.5 Mr. Patel quickly became a well-respected member
of his community.6 All of Mr. Patel’s immediate family—his wife,
his four children, and his brother—legally resided in the United
States as well.7
Despite the fact that the INS approved Mr. Patel’s application
for naturalization, the immigration authorities failed to schedule his
oath of allegiance.8 Mr. Patel, frustrated with the holdup, filed an
action challenging the delay, and in 2000, a district court ordered the
immigration authority to administer the oath.9 Instead, the
immigration authority revoked its approval of Mr. Patel’s request for
naturalization, initiated proceedings to have him removed from the
country, and placed him in immigration detention.10
The year prior, Mr. Patel had been charged with harboring an
undocumented alien, an offense that Mr. Patel pleaded guilty to after
admitting to employing and housing the undocumented immigrant.11
The conviction constituted an “aggravated felony” that authorized
1. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
2. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 4, Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2001) (No. 012398), abrogated by Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 4 n.1.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Id. at 4–5, 5 n.2.
8. Id. at 4 n.1.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 4 n.1, 5–6.
11. Id.
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immigration authorities to mandatorily detain Mr. Patel, without a
bond hearing, during the entire removal process.12 Although
Mr. Patel, a long-standing, law-abiding, legal permanent resident,
was sentenced to only five months in prison for his offense, he was
confined in detention for almost a year.13
Mr. Patel’s story highlights some of the inequities that mar the
United States’ immigration detention system. Currently, immigration
authorities can detain noncitizens without individualized hearings.14
Without such hearings, however, the government cannot determine
which noncitizens should be detained during the removal process and
which noncitizens could be monitored through less invasive and
expensive means. Moreover, as there are no time limits on preremoval detention, confinement can drag on,15 as illustrated by
Mr. Patel’s case where the length of his detention was six months
longer than the time he served for the underlying offense.16 The
current immigration detention system is highly punitive in character,
and yet it fails to provide individuals like Mr. Patel with even the
basic procedural protections that exist in all other forms of civil
detention.
Part II of this Article will provide a background of immigration
detention. Because immigration detention is essentially preventive
detention, Part II will also explain the basic contours of preventive
detention and the procedural safeguards that generally inhere in
preventive detention schemes.
Part III argues that the current conditions of confinement are
constitutionally problematic for two reasons. First, although it is
purportedly civil, the system has taken on a quasi-punitive character.
Second, the system is unregulated. Part IV hones in on pre-removal
order detention—the period of time before the court determines that
a noncitizen is deportable and issues its removal order. Part IV
demonstrates why the absence of two safeguards—individualized
hearings and time limits—is constitutionally suspect. Part V

12. Id. at 5–6; see 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2006).
13. Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 309 (3d. Cir. 2001), abrogated by Demore v. Kim, 538
U.S. 510 (2003).
14. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 530–31.
15. See id. at 567–68 (Souter, J., dissenting).
16. Patel, 275 F.3d at 309, abrogated by Demore, 538 U.S. at 510.
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entertains and ultimately rejects the common justifications for the
absence of these protections in the context of immigration detention.
Part VI recommends an overhaul of the immigration detention
system based on the limitations and protections that are present in
other forms of civil detention. Part VI asserts that immigrants facing
detention should receive individualized hearings to determine
whether they pose threats to the public or risks of flight. Part VI also
argues that there should be time limits on detention. Part VI then
recommends that the government should reform the conditions of
confinement to reflect the civil, regulatory purpose of immigrant
detention and enforce those reforms through binding regulations.
Finally, Part VI recommends that the government embrace
alternative models of detention.
II. BACKGROUND
To comprehend the problems of our current immigration
detention system, one must understand not only the procedures,
statutes, and infrastructure involved but also the underlying policies
and rationale. Immigration detention is theoretically preventive
detention. However, the system is often at odds with its purported
goals.
A. Background to Immigration Detention
Each year the United States detains more than 300,000
immigrants, and the figure is steadily climbing.17 The government
must spend $1.7 billion a year to accommodate the volume of
immigrants passing through the system, and, as the numbers rise, the
financial ramifications worsen.18 The system’s rapid expansion is
largely attributable to two pieces of legislation passed in 1996—the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)19 and the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act

17. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORMING OUR
IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM AND PROMOTING ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION
PROCEEDINGS 1 (2009) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION PROJECT], available at http://www.
constitutionproject.org/pdf/359.pdf.
18. Tom Barry, Mass Incarceration of Immigrants, BORDER LINES (May 24, 2009,
11:48 AM), http://borderlinesblog.blogspot.com/2009/05/mass-incarceration-of-immigrants.html.
19. Pub. L. No. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).

Summer 2011] PREVENTIVE DETENTION DISTORTED

1483

(IIRIRA).20 These provisions concurrently expanded the categories of
immigrants that are subject to mandatory detention.21 Just two years
after Congress passed AEDPA and IIRIRA, the number of
immigrants in detention nearly doubled, increasing from 8,500 in
1996 to nearly 16,000 in 1998.22
The system’s growth can also be traced to immigration
enforcement agencies’ increased reliance on home and workplace
raids23 as well as to the government’s overall stricter enforcement of
immigration laws in the wake of the September 11th terrorist
attacks.24 Because of these changes in policy and legislation, each
year the detention system struggles to hold a greater number of
immigrants; there is no end in sight to the mass influx.25 In 2008, the
United States detained a record-setting 378,582 immigrants,26
surpassing the 2004 figure of 231,500 by more than 80,000.27
1. Statutory Framework
The United States detains a diverse range of immigrants
pursuant to several statutory provisions.28 Section 236(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) gives the Department of
20. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
21. See DONALD KERWIN & SERIN YI-YING LIN, MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION
DETENTION: CAN ICE MEET ITS IMPERATIVES AND CASE MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES? 6
(2009), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/detentionreportSept1009.pdf; Analysis
of Immigration Detention Policies, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 18, 1999), http://www.
aclu.org/immigrants-rights/analysis-immigration-detention-policies; see also Nina Rabin,
Immigration Detention in Arizona: A Quietly Growing System Crying out for Reform, 45 ARIZ.
ATT’Y, July–Aug. 2009, at 31, 31 (2009) (“The skyrocketing rate of growth of detention over the
past decade is a direct result of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act . . . .”).
22. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 21.
23. KAREN TUMLIN ET AL., NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., A BROKEN SYSTEM vi, 1
(2009), available at http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/arrestdet/A-Broken-System-2009-07.pdf.
24. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 13–14.
25. Michelle Brané & Christiana Lundholm, Human Rights Behind Bars: Advancing the
Rights of Immigration Detainees in the United States Through Human Rights Frameworks, 22
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 147, 147 (2008) (“[T]he rise in numbers is poised to continue well into the
future.”).
26. KERWIN & LIN, supra note 21, at 7; DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT: IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/icedetention-rpt.pdf.
27. Barry, supra note 18.
28. CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 108.02 (2010).
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Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
discretion to detain immigrants during removal proceedings.29 If
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a division of DHS,
takes an immigrant into custody, ICE may, during the pendency of
removal hearings, continue to detain or release the immigrant on a
bond.30
Next, under INA section 235(b)(1), the Secretary of Homeland
Security must detain arriving aliens who are subject to expedited
removal.31 Expedited removal is a summary process for expelling
noncitizens who have not officially entered the United States and
who do not possess proper documentation.32 Under current law, this
category includes persons seeking political asylum.33 Before the
enactment of IIRIRA, asylum-seekers were automatically released on
parole while their applications were adjudicated.34 Now, their
detention is mandatory until ICE determines whether they
demonstrate a credible fear of persecution.35 If they cannot establish
that fear, they will be detained until they are removed.36
Pursuant to INA section 235(b)(2)(A),37 arriving aliens who are
inadmissible38 but not subject to expedited removal—meaning that
they are inadmissible for reasons other than improper documentation

29. Id. § 108.02(1).
30. Id. (stating that bond must be at least $1,500). To obtain release, the immigrant must
demonstrate that he or she will not abscond or endanger his or her community. Id. § 108.05(2)(a).
Should the immigrant be released on bond, ICE may rearrest and detain the immigrant at any
time. Id. § 108.02(1).
31. Id. § 108.02(2)(a).
32. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 3.
33. Id. Asylum-seekers are immigrants who hope to gain refugee status in the United States
based on a fear of prosecution in their home country. Id. The United States detains approximately
1,400 noncriminal asylum-seekers each day. SCHRIRO, supra note 26, at 11.
34. GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.02(2)(a).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2006).
38. An alien can be found “inadmissible” if the alien has been convicted of or admits to
having committed particular crimes, if the alien is determined to have certain communicable
diseases or disorders, if the alien is suspected to be involved in espionage or terrorist activities, if
the alien is present without being admitted or paroled, if the alien does not possess proper
documentation, if the alien has been previously removed, if the alien is a practicing polygamist,
or if the alien has committed fraud or misrepresentation in an attempt to procure documentation.
Id. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)–(10) (2006).
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or misrepresentation—are, nevertheless, subject to mandatory
detention.39
Additionally, under INA section 236(c),40 immigrants who are
convicted of certain criminal offenses must be detained.41 This
category of “criminal aliens” breaks down into three subgroups,
depending in part on whether the immigrant has legally entered the
country.42 First, an immigrant who has not yet entered the country
will be subject to mandatory detention if he or she has multiple prior
criminal convictions43 or has been convicted of any one of a number
of specified crimes.44 Next, an immigrant who has entered the
country is deportable and subject to mandatory detention if he or she
commits any one of a number of specified crimes within a designated
number of years from the time that he or she was admitted to the
country.45 Finally, an immigrant is either inadmissible and subject to
mandatory detention or deportable and subject to mandatory
detention for engaging in terrorist activity.46 Criminal aliens are only
paroled when their release is necessary to further a government
investigation.47 Otherwise, they can only challenge their detention on
39. Id. § 1225. The alien is detained for a proceeding under Id. § 240. Id. § 1229.
40. Id. § 1226.
41. Id.
42. For the difference between legal entrance and non-entrance, see Deborah M. Levy,
Detention in the Asylum Context, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 297, 298 (1983) (“Under the fiction by
which ‘admitted’ and ‘unadmitted’ aliens are distinguished, aliens taken into custody upon
arrival, and aliens who present themselves to the authorities without evading inspection, have not
made an ‘entry’ and are not ‘within’ the United States . . . .” (citing Shaughnessy v. United States
ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953))).
43. In order to fall within this category of inadmissible persons who are subject to
mandatory detention, the criminal convictions must add up to at least a five-year aggregate
sentence. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).
44. Id.; GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.02(2)(b) (an arriving alien is inadmissible if he or she
has been convicted of one of the following: a crime of moral turpitude, controlled substance
violations, drug trafficking, prostitution and commercialized vice, or involvement in human
trafficking).
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)–(iii), (B), (C), (D); GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.02(2)(b)
(a noncitizen is deportable and subject to mandatory detention if the noncitizen committed a
crime of moral turpitude within five years of admission or within ten years for lawful permanent
residents, provided: at least a one-year sentence was imposed; the noncitizen received multiple
moral-turpitude convictions after entering the United States; the noncitizen received an
aggravated-felony conviction after admission into the United States; the noncitizen received a
controlled-substance conviction after admission into the United States; the noncitizen was
charged with certain firearm offenses after admission into the United States; or the noncitizen
committed a crime of sabotage, espionage, sedition, or treason).
46. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B), 1227(a)(4)(B); GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.02(2)(b).
47. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 5.
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grounds that the governing statute does not apply to their case.48 In
order to prevail on such a theory, the immigrant must carry a heavy
burden and show that the government is “‘substantially unlikely’ to
prove that an underlying conviction makes the non-citizen subject to
mandatory detention.”49
Finally, pursuant to INA section 241(a), the government must
detain all immigrants who have received a final order of removal for
a ninety-day “removal period.”50 If the government fails to remove
the immigrant or the immigrant does not leave within that time
frame, then the immigrant may be released, subject to an order of
supervision, only if the immigrant can establish that he or she does
not pose a danger to the community or a significant risk of flight.51
2. Facilities and Conditions of Detention
The immigration detention system consists of three main types
of facilities: Service Processing Centers (SPCs), Contract Detention
Facilities (CDFs), and Intergovernmental Service Agreement
facilities (IGSAs).52 Each of these types of facilities are owned or
operated, to varying degrees, by private companies.53 For instance,
ICE frequently enters into contractual arrangements with private
companies that in turn staff SPC facilities with guards and other
personnel.54 Similarly, CDFs are owned and operated by private, forprofit contractors.55 ICE places the largest number of detainees in
local prisons and jails—oftentimes alongside or even commingled
with the criminal population56—pursuant to intergovernmental

48. See GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.05(3)(a)(i) (“Detained noncitizens may challenge
their inclusion under the mandatory-detention provisions of the INA. . . . [A] noncitizen held
pursuant to INA § 236(c) may seek a Joseph hearing in front of an [immigration judge] to
determine whether the individual is ‘properly included’ within the mandatory-detention
categories.”).
49. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 6.
50. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a); GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.02(2)(c).
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3); GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.02(2)(c).
52. TUMLIN, supra note 23, at 4.
53. Id.
54. ICE currently operates seven SPCs that hold about 13 percent of ICE immigrant
detainees. Id.
55. Id. CDFs hold about 17 percent of immigrant detainees. Id.
56. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 15.
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service agreements.57 Many IGSA facilities are operated by private,
for-profit prison companies.58
Immigrants in detention are held in strict, jail-like facilities
under jail-like conditions.59 They are often “transported in shackles,
subjected to strip searches, [and] confined to ‘lock down’ for
hours.”60 They are housed in secure facilities with hardened
perimeters and held under management plans that are largely based
on command and control.61 In fact, ICE’s detention standards are
“based upon corrections law” and are thereby designed to control the
operation of jails and prisons rather than of civil detention facilities.62
In addition, detention facilities are frequently located in remote areas
of the country where detainees cannot easily access legal resources
and are often isolated from their families and loved ones.63 DHS is at
liberty to transfer detainees between the facilities scattered across the
United States.64
Immigration detention facilities do not follow any form of
binding regulation.65 With the exception of IGSAs—ironically where
the majority of immigrants are held66—immigration detention
facilities are governed by nationwide detention standards, although
these standards do not have the force of law and do not carry the
same weight that codified regulation does.67
In January 2010, in the wake of myriad reports of detainee
deaths68 as well as egregious incidents of detention staff
misconduct,69 DHS replaced the National Detention Standards with
57. TUMLIN, supra note 23, at 4. Currently, there are more than 350 IGSA facilities holding
approximately 67 percent of detainees. Id.
58. Id.
59. SCHRIRO, supra note 26, at 4.
60. Rabin, supra note 21, at 32.
61. SCHRIRO, supra note 26, at 4.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.04(1)(a).
65. See TUMLIN, supra note 23, at vi.
66. Id.
67. Id. (“[N]oncompliance carries no real penalty.”).
68. See Darryl Fears, 3 Jailed Immigrants Die in a Month, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2007, at
A02.
69. See Bryan Lonegan, American Diaspora: The Deportation of Lawful Residents from the
United States and the Destruction of Their Families, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 55, 67–
68 n.71 (noting that immigration staff has reportedly used threats of violence and deportation to

1488

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1477

the Performance Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS).70
Like the old standards, the PBNDS delineate the acceptable living
conditions for detainees, including access to legal materials, food
service, recreation, telephone access, and medical care.71 Although
the new standards purportedly improve on the former standards by
setting forth desired outcomes,72 the two are strikingly similar and
will still not apply to IGSAs, where most detainees are held.73
Furthermore, despite the efforts of immigration reform advocates,
DHS declines to give the new regulations the force of law.74
3. Length of Detention
Removal proceedings are not formally limited by time
constraints,75 and detention can last for months or even years.76
Although records regarding the numbers of immigrants passing
through the detention system are not entirely accurate,77 a study
conducted by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) provides some
coerce detainees into performing sex acts); see also Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration
Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 47 (2010), available at http://www.
columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/110/42_Anil_Kalhan.pdf (noting that more than
one hundred detainees have died in custody since 2003, and pointing to inadequate health care
and neglect as contributing factors).
70. GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.04(1)(b).
71. Id. § 108.04(1)(b)–(c).
72. Id. § 108.04(1)(b).
73. TUMLIN, supra note 23, at 2–3.
74. DHS Refuses Rulemaking on Detention Standards, NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM
(Aug. 13,
2009),
http://www.immigrationforum.org/policy/agencies-display/dhs-refusesrulemaking-on-detention-standards/ (“Advocates had sought rulemaking by the agency in 2007,
and DHS neglected to respond at all until June 2009, when it received a court order to do so with
a 30 day deadline. Twenty-nine days later, DHS denied the advocates’ petition, asserting that the
guidelines in place were sufficient.”).
75. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 567 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting).
76. See Welch v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 213, 227 (4th Cir. 2002) (lawful permanent resident
mandatorily detained fourteen months before district court ordered bond hearing); see also
Abimbola v. Ashcroft, No. 01CV5568(NG), 2002 WL 2003186, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2002)
(noncitizen mandatorily detained twenty months before BIA order).
77. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., No. OIG-07-08,
REVIEW OF U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT’S DETAINEE TRACKING PROCESS
1 (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_07-08_Nov06.pdf (“The
detainee tracking system, for five of the eight ICE detention facilities tested, did not always
contain timely information. . . . At six of eight ICE detention facilities tested, [the Deportable
Alien Control System] and detention facility records did not always agree on the location of
detainees, or contained information showing the detainee had been deported.”); see also
AMNESTY INT’L, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE USA 18 (2009),
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/JailedWithoutJustice.pdf (noting that the precise
number of immigrants detained each year “is not known as the DHS does not publish this data”).
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insight into the statistics, on average, of time spent in detention.78
MPI found that the average (mean) length of detention for detainees
who were still awaiting a removal determination (“pre-removal order
detainees”) was eighty-one days.79 With respect to those who had
received a final removal order (“post-removal order detainees”), the
average length of detention subsequent to receiving the removal
order was seventy-two days up to that date.80 For post-removal order
detainees, the average amount of total time spent in detention up to
that date, counting from the first day in detention until the day that
MPI collected its data, was 114 days.81 According to the study, 1,792
persons had already been detained for over six months.82
Most of the detainees who were counted in the study were not
released the same day that the study was taken and remained in
detention for days afterwards.83 Thus, in order to get a true picture of
detention duration, the averages would have to be increased to reflect
how long the detainees remained in confinement after the study
concluded.
B. Background to Preventive Detention
There are two main purposes behind immigration detention: to
ensure that the government can successfully remove noncitizens by
preventing immigrants from absconding before their removal
hearings or after a final order of deportation, and to prevent
deportable immigrants from committing crimes and endangering the
public during the removal process.84 Immigration detention,
therefore, is essentially preventive detention—it is not meant to exact
a punitive sentence but is an administrative measure designed to help
78. KERWIN & LIN, supra note 21, at 6. The MPI study was based on information obtained
pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, which required ICE to release data pertaining to the
32,000 detainees currently in its custody on January 25, 2009. MPI used this snapshot data to
produce its findings. Id. at 4–5.
79. Id. at 16. Twenty-six percent (4,848 persons) had already been detained for ninety days
or longer, and 3 percent (570 persons) had been detained for one year or longer. Id.
80. Id. at 17.
81. Id.
82. Id. (footnote omitted).
83. Id. at 19 n.40.
84. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003) (“We hold that Congress, justifiably
concerned that deportable criminal aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime and
fail to appear for their removal hearings in large numbers, may require that persons such as
respondent be detained for the brief period necessary for their removal proceedings.”).
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the government keep track of immigrants who might ultimately be
ordered removed and to prevent removable immigrants from
committing crimes in the interim.85
In 1987, the Supreme Court considered the constitutional limits
of preventive detention in United States v. Salerno.86 The Court held
that preventive detention under the Bail Reform Act did not violate
the Due Process Clause because the Act served a legitimate
regulatory purpose and Congress carefully limited the circumstances
in which pretrial detention could be sought.87 The Bail Reform Act
authorized pretrial detention of persons charged with particular
felonies on the ground of future dangerousness, but only after the
government demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence in an
adversarial hearing that no conditions of release could reasonably
assure that the arrestee would not pose a danger to the public.88 The
judicial officer was required to consider factors such as “the nature
and seriousness of the charges, the substantiality of the
Government’s evidence against the arrestee, the arrestee’s
background and characteristics, and the nature and seriousness of the
danger posed by the suspect’s release.”89 The Bail Reform Act
entitled the arrestee to numerous procedural protections during the
detention hearing, including the right to request counsel, to testify, to
present witnesses, to proffer evidence, and to cross-examine other
witnesses.90 The Bail Reform Act also mandated that detainees be
housed separately from convicts, and another piece of legislation, the
Speedy Trial Act, strictly limited the maximum length of detention.91
85. In fact, immigration detention is necessarily preventive detention because DHS is not
authorized to detain persons for punitive purposes since this authority is unique to the criminal
justice system. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 241 (1896) (holding that
sentencing an immigrant to hard labor amounted to punitive punishment, which could only be
inflicted on a person pursuant to the authority of the criminal justice system); see also David
Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003,
1006 n.14 (2002) (“The INS has no authority to detain aliens for any purposes other than
prevention.”). As for the minority of immigrants who are detained on the basis of criminal
conduct, they have all served their criminal sentences by the time they enter detention. See
KERWIN & LIN, supra note 21, at 1 (finding that only 42 percent of detainees had criminal
records).
86. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
87. Id. at 747–48.
88. Id. at 742.
89. Id. at 742–43.
90. Id. at 751–52.
91. Id. at 747.
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In its decision, the Court considered the Act’s legislative
purpose: to prevent a limited class of felons from committing
additional crimes while released on bail.92 In light of the extensive
procedural protections afforded to arrestees, the Court determined
that pretrial detention was not excessive in relation to that purpose.93
In reaching its decision, the Court emphasized that pretrial
detention could only be sought for the “most serious of crimes” and
observed that there were “stringent time limitations.”94 The Court
also mentioned that excessively prolonged pretrial detention would
be punitive and therefore unconstitutional.95 Finally, the Court stated
that because the Bail Reform Act authorized pretrial detention only
after the state carried a substantial burden, it was not a “scattershot
attempt to incapacitate” all persons who were suspected of
committing serious crimes.96
In upholding pretrial detention, the Court also pointed to the
procedural rights afforded to the arrestee; namely, the Bail Reform
Act required an adversarial hearing regarding the arrestee’s
dangerousness and placed strict time limits on pretrial detention.
In nonimmigration contexts, the Supreme Court continues to
uphold the use of preventive detention when Salerno-type
protections are present;97 however, when these protections are absent,
the Court holds that preventive detention is unconstitutional.98

92. Id.
93. Id. at 746–48.
94. Id. at 747.
95. Id. However, the Court declined to answer at what point detention would be considered
excessively prolonged. Id. at 747 n.4.
96. Id. at 750.
97. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362–64, 371 (1997) (upholding the
preventive detention of sexual predators because the detention was preceded by an adversarial
hearing that afforded the individual robust procedural protections, including the right to statefunded counsel, the right to present and cross-examine witnesses, and the right to an annual case
review to determine if detention was still warranted).
98. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 81–82 (1992) (holding that the preventive
detention of an insanity acquitee violated due process because the authorizing statute lacked the
procedural protections central to the holding in Salerno, and stating “[u]nlike the sharply focused
scheme at issue in Salerno, the Louisiana scheme of confinement is not carefully limited.”); see
also Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 415 (2002) (holding that a state law authorizing the civil
commitment of sex offenders was unconstitutional because it did not require an adversarial
hearing as to whether the offender lacked control over the dangerous behavior).

1492

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1477

III. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT:
PUNISHMENT THAT
FITS NO CRIME
Given the ubiquitous nature of Salerno-type protections in other
preventive detention schemes, it is striking that virtually no
protections attach to immigration detention. Immigrants are not
entitled to pre-detention adversarial hearings concerning whether
they pose a threat to their community or are likely to abscond.99 If an
immigrant seeks to challenge discretionary detention, he or she,
rather than the government, carries the burden of proof.100 Even if an
immigration judge determines that the immigrant is eligible for
parole, DHS can override this decision and require continued
detention.101 If an immigrant wants to challenge mandatory detention
based on criminal offenses, the immigrant carries a heavy burden of
proof and must show that the government is substantially unlikely to
prevail.102 Furthermore, there is no time limit imposed on preremoval order detention.103 Detention is not restricted to the “most
serious” crimes, as an immigrant can be detained based on relatively
minor traffic-related offenses104 or simply for requesting political
asylum.105 ICE does not conduct individual assessments to determine
whether conditions of release could serve state ends,106 and
immigrants are often detained among criminal populations107 and in
settings where the conditions of confinement do not reflect the

99. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003).
100. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 6.
101. Michael S. Vastine, Good Things Come to Those Who Wait? Reconsidering
Indeterminate and Indefinite Detention as Tools in U.S. Immigration Policy, 5 INTERCULTURAL
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 125, 147–48 (2010).
102. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 6.
103. Id.
104. KERWIN & LIN, supra note 21, at 2 (“The ‘most serious’ convictions for nearly 20
percent of criminal aliens in ICE custody were for traffic-related (13 percent) and immigrationrelated (6 percent) offenses.”).
105. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (2006).
106. Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention, 45
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601, 610–13 (2010) (discussing how immigration detention has shifted
from a system that utilized parole to a system that now prohibits release on parole for mandatory
holds).
107. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 77, at 37.
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regulatory purpose of detention. Finally, immigrants in detention
have no right to government-funded counsel.108
The absence of Salerno-type procedural safeguards in
immigration proceedings is troubling, especially in light of the
current state of the immigration detention system. The system is so
drastically and fundamentally broken that even if there were fullfledged procedural safeguards in place, it would still be
constitutionally suspect for the government to place anyone in
detention. Therefore, in an effort to reveal what is truly at stake for
those who are detained without procedural protections, this part will
provide an analysis of the problems that occur at the ground level of
immigration detention.
The immigration detention system is broken for two reasons.
First, the system is civil only in theory; in practice, it is very much a
punitive institution.109 Second, the system is not governed by binding
regulation.110 Together these defects generate a host of problems for
detainees and cast serious doubt on the constitutionality of the entire
system.
A. Although Purportedly Civil,
the Detention System Is Highly Punitive
Within the current immigration detention model, it is impossible
to draw any meaningful distinction between civil custody and penal
incarceration.111 Detainees are often handcuffed or shackled,
subjected to invasive body searches, and forced to stand for hours
during bed checks.112 They face severe limitations on visitation,
movement, and recreation as well as limited access to legal and
medical services.113 Many detainees are even housed in jails and are
sometimes—in contravention of detention standards—commingled

108. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 8.
109. See, e.g., Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006) (“[I]mmigration law and the criminal justice system
are merely nominally separate.”).
110. See Tumlin, supra note 23, at 1.
111. See Stumpf, supra note 109, at 376.
112. See Riddhi Mukhopadhyay, Death in Detention: Medical and Mental Health
Consequences of Indefinite Detention of Immigrants in the United States, 7 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC.
JUST. 693, 707–08 (2009).
113. Id. at 708.
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with the criminal population.114 Given the prevalence of jail
violence,115 this commingling threatens the security and physical
well-being of the detained immigrants. Moreover, guards at
commingled facilities do not differentiate between the two
populations and reportedly treat immigrant detainees in the same
way that they treat criminal convicts.116 In one instance, five Bureau
of Prison officials admitted during an interview that they did not
know immigration-specific detention standards even existed, so they
trained their corrections officers to treat detainees in the same way
that they treated inmates.117 The deprivations and dangers that
detainees face in immigration detention are thus virtually
indistinguishable from those that criminal inmates face in jail.118 This
similitude raises constitutional concerns for a number of reasons.
1. The Current Immigration Detention System
Is Excessive in Relation to Its Regulatory Goal
The immigration detention system should be narrowly tailored
to serve its administrative function, as detention that is excessive in
light of its stated purpose is unconstitutional.119 The immigration
detention system, however, has strayed significantly from its
purported goals. It is designed to serve an administrative, civil
purpose, yet it closely mirrors penal incarceration. As a result,
immigration detention is both excessive and unconstitutional.
Although nominally civil, immigration detention is very much a
punitive system. The correlation between immigration detention and
prison is troubling because the two systems are based on divergent
governmental objectives. Criminal incarceration is meant to punish

114. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 77, at 37.
115. John J. Gibbons & Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Confronting Confinement, 22 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 385, 399 (2006) (“There is disturbing evidence of individual assaults and patterns
of violence in some U.S. prisons and jails . . . . Former prisoners recounted gang violence, rape,
[and] beatings by officers . . . .”).
116. GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.04(2)(a) (citation omitted).
117. Brané & Lundholm, supra note 25, at 161–62 (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., No. OIG-07-01, TREATMENT OF IMMIGRATION DETAINEES HOUSED
AT IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT FACILITIES 31 (2006), available at
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P1598.pdf).
118. See, e.g., Raha Jorjani, U.S. Immigration Detention: Policy and Procedure from a
Human Rights Perspective, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 89, 91 (“To an individual who
is behind bars, the difference between ‘prison’ and ‘detention’ is purely academic.”).
119. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746–47 (1987).
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persons for past criminal conduct,120 while immigration detention is
merely an administrative tool designed to facilitate efforts to remove
deportable immigrants.121 Most immigrants in detention are not
criminals at all,122 so there is no legal or moral basis on which to
subject them to punishment. Further, the state has no interest in
incarcerating detainees who have already completed their criminal
sentences by the time they enter the immigration detention system.123
Therefore, the punitive aspects of detention are necessarily excessive
in light of the system’s nonpunitive purpose.
Many conditions of detention—including overcrowding, lack of
adequate visitation hours, insufficient ventilation, poor food,
inadequate water, unclean quarters, malfunctioning toilets, and both
verbal and physical abuse inflicted by inmates and guards124—are
utterly indefensible, as such conditions are egregious even in the
penitentiary context.
2. Criminal Conditions Without Criminal Protections
The similarity between immigration detention and criminal
incarceration is problematic because immigrant detainees are not
entitled to the same constitutional protections that their criminal
counterparts enjoy.125 Most strikingly, immigrants in detention are
not entitled to government-funded counsel.126 As a result, most
120. See DANIEL E. HALL., CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 29 (5th ed. 2009)
(“[P]unishment through the criminal justice system is society’s method of avenging a wrong. The
idea that one who commits a wrong must be punished is an old one.”).
121. See Mukhopadhyay, supra note 112, at 694; see also Raha Jorjani, Ignoring the Court’s
Order: The Automobile Stay in Immigration Detention Cases, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 89, 91 (2009) (noting that immigration detention is governed by civil, administrative laws).
122. KERWIN & LIN, supra note 21, at 1 (finding that 58 percent of detainees did not have
criminal records).
123. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 558 n.14 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting that the State of California has no interest in further detention after
a detainee has completed his or her criminal sentence).
124. Kalhan, supra note 69, at 47 (citing AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 77, at 29–43).
125. See Brané & Lundholm, supra note 25, at 151 (“[A] person detained under immigration
law is not protected by the same rights and safeguards as someone in the criminal process.”
(citing DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS
IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 34 (2003))); see also Cole, supra note 85, at 1014 (“The fact that the
Constitution limits the imposition of custody in the bail and civil commitment settings does not
necessarily mean that it constrains immigration detention to the same extent . . . immigration
exceptionalism is well-documented . . . . ”). As Part IV, infra, will explain, detainees awaiting
deportation do not even receive the same procedural protections that detainees in other forms of
civil detention do.
126. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 8.
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immigrants represent themselves in deportation hearings,127 despite
the fact that the stakes are very high,128 the law is very complex,129
and language barriers tend to complicate the entire process.130 Pro
bono legal services are often unobtainable because detention
facilities are located in remote areas of the country;131 where such
services are available, transfers frequently disrupt whatever attorneyclient relationships that may have formed.132 Because the conditions
of immigration detention mirror those of penal incarceration, and
because a rapidly growing number of immigrants are detained and
subjected to these conditions each year, “legal representation during
removal proceedings is more important than ever.”133
3. Confinement as an Obstruction to Justice
The conditions of confinement are problematic because they
keep many immigrants from pursuing meritorious claims to stay in
the country.134 Although DHS135 and the Supreme Court136 both insist
that immigration detention is a short-term measure designed to
facilitate removal hearings, “in reality, it becomes a long, unbearable
process for most.”137 Many immigrants simply cannot endure the
127. Id.; Cole, supra note 85, at 35 (“Eighty percent of immigration detainees are
unrepresented.”).
128. Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469, 479 (1963) (“[D]eportation is a drastic
sanction, one which can destroy lives and disrupt families . . . .”).
129. Castro-O’Ryan v. U.S. Dep’t of Immigration & Naturalization, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th
Cir. 1988) (“[T]he immigration laws have been termed ‘second only to the Internal Revenue Code
in complexity.’” (quoting E. HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL 107 (1985))).
130. Brané & Lundholm, supra note 25, at 160 (“Interpretation services in detention are
frequently unavailable or insufficient.”).
131. See Mukhopadhyay, supra note 112, at 705 (“Even if [asylum seekers] are able to find
an attorney who is willing to assist them, it is difficult for the asylum seeker to meet and work
with the attorney due to the isolated location of many detention facilities.”).
132. See CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 10 (recommending that before transfer
decisions are made, agencies should take into consideration whether transferring a detainee will
adversely affect an existing attorney-client relationship).
133. Id. at 8.
134. See Brané & Lundholm, supra note 25, at 160 (“The hardships of detention often force
asylum seekers to abandon meritorious claims, simply in order to gain release.”).
135. See Mukhopadhyay, supra note 112, at 694 (noting that DHS classifies detention as a
nonpunitive, short-term administrative measure to ensure noncitizens appear at their immigration
hearing).
136. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 528 (2003) (distinguishing the case from precedent,
where post-removal order detention was held to be potentially indefinite on the grounds that preremoval order detention is “of a much shorter duration” than post-removal order detention).
137. Mukhopadhyay, supra note 112, at 704.
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harsh, highly punitive conditions of confinement; consequently, they
often voluntarily deport themselves through a process known as
stipulated removal.138 In 2004, the year when the government
implemented the stipulated removal procedure, there were only 5,481
stipulated removal orders; the following year that number nearly
tripled; and, by 2008, the number of stipulated removals was
projected to reach 34,890.139
This phenomenon, where immigrants voluntarily abandon their
claims in order to escape the suffering that they experience in
detention, is perhaps most tragic with respect to asylum-seekers and
torture survivors. These individuals come to the United States to
escape state-sponsored abuse and torture, and they are undoubtedly
astonished and disheartened to learn that they will be detained in jaillike facilities and treated like prisoners while their asylum
applications are processed.140 This detention, moreover, can stand in
the way of just resolution of asylum petitions.141 Without proper
medical and mental health support, asylum-seekers have difficulty
processing and articulating the abuse that they have endured; thus,
they are less likely to win their cases,142 especially if they are
representing themselves without the support of counsel, which, as
mentioned above, is often the reality.143 What is more, asylumseekers and torture survivors are especially vulnerable to the
inhumane and prison-like conditions of detention and can actually be
retraumatized by their experiences in confinement.144 As a result,
138. Stipulated removal is a procedure, authorized by IIRIRA, that enables noncitizens to
waive their rights to a hearing and any relief from removal without ever appearing before an
immigration judge. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., OVERVIEW OF KEY IMMIGRATION
ISSUES FACING THE IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS MOVEMENT 3 (2009), available at http://
www.nilc.org/dc_conf/flashdrive09/Immigration-Law-and-Enforcement/imm1_imm-issuesoverview-2009-11-05.pdf.
139. Jayashri Srikantiah & Karen Tumlin, Backgrounder: Stipulated Removal, IMMIGRANTS’
RTS. CLINIC, 1, http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/clinics/immigrantsrights/pressrelease/
Stipulated_removal_backgrounder.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
140. Mukhopadhyay, supra note 112, at 705.
141. Id. (“Inhumane and prison-like detention conditions can hinder an immigrant’s ability to
discuss his or her claim . . . . If the asylum seeker is unable to testify about the persecution she
suffered, an asylum officer or immigration judge may inaccurately conclude that the asylum
seeker is not credible and is therefore ineligible for asylum.”).
142. Id.
143. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 8.
144. Mukhopadhyay, supra note 112, at 709 (explaining how the prison-like conditions and
treatment in detention facilities compound asylum seekers’ trauma).
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these immigrants are more likely to forgo their claims and stipulate
to their removal simply in order to get out of detention.145
Unfortunately, the immigrants who have suffered the most—
such as victims of torture, rape, and prosecutions—are most
vulnerable to harsh detention conditions. Unable to withstand the
environment, they therefore are the first to give up their claims.146
B. The Detention System Is Dangerously Unregulated
The second major problem with the immigration detention
system is the lack of binding regulation. Neither the former National
Detention Standards nor the recently promulgated PBNDS carry the
force of law.147 Because there are no enforceable rules in place, there
is no way to hold facilities accountable when they fail to maintain
suitable detention standards. Indeed, part of the problem stems from
the fact that detention officials have broad discretion when it comes
to defining what is suitable.148
1. The Regulation Gap
The lack of regulation has allowed the detention system to
deteriorate to the point where the conditions of confinement are not
only punitive but also inhumane.149 Reform advocates point to the
absence of binding regulation as a cause of the high number of
deaths, suicides, and human-rights abuses that have occurred in
immigration detention facilities in recent years.150 Moreover, the lack
of enforceable regulation has created a significant gap between
145. See Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, The Trafficking and Exploitation Victims Assistance
Program: A Proposed Early Response Plan for Victims of International Trafficking in the United
States, 38 N.M. L. REV. 373, 405 (2008) (“[Detention has] a severe negative psychological
impact, resulting in many bona fide refugees giving up their asylum claims and accepting
deportation rather than remaining incarcerated.”).
146. See id. at 709–11.
147. TUMLIN, supra note 23, at 4–5. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OPERATIONS
MANUAL ICE PERFORMANCE BASED NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS (2008), available at
http://www.ice.gov/detention-standards/2008/, to review the PBNDS.
148. TUMLIN, supra note 23, at 8 (“Excessive reliance on reviewer discretion and ‘good
judgment’ rendered ICE’s self-reviews inherently unreliable, as review findings could neither be
replicated by other reviewers nor meaningfully evaluated for accuracy.”).
149. See, e.g., Brané & Lundholm, supra note 25, at 160 (“[T]he conditions themselves may
also infringe on human rights guarantees.”).
150. Kalhan, supra note 69, at 47 (“These deprivations have been exacerbated by a range of
detention related policies and practices . . . . Over 100 detainees have died in custody since 2003,
often due to neglect of their health needs.”).
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detention standards—which, although nonbinding, are intended to
govern the general affairs of detention facilities151—and everyday
detention practices.152 For instance, there have been reports of
inadequate medical care,153 failures to provide law libraries and
access to updated legal materials,154 breaches of visitation and phoneaccess policies,155 violations of recreation standards,156
overcrowding,157 excessive use of force, abuse by detention guards,158
and sexual misconduct on the part of the staff.159 ICE has also been
criticized for both failing to report and covering up160 deaths of
persons in detention. In addition, the staggering rate of detainee

151. GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.04(1)(b)–(c).
152. TUMLIN, supra note 23, at vi.
153. Id. at xi (“[O]ver 30 facilities failed to provide segregated detainees with required health
care visits.”); id. at 73 (“Facilities failed to provide adequate medical screening of newly arriving
detainees.”).
154. Id. at 33 (“29 detention facilities lacked an actual law library . . . . Law libraries at 59
facilities did not contain some or all of the required legal material . . . . 30 facilities failed to
designate an employee to update legal material . . . . 27 facilities inappropriately limited
detainees’ access to their law libraries . . . . 15 facilities failed to equip their law libraries with any
typewriters or computers . . . . 20 facilities had inadequate numbers of computers or
typewriters . . . .”).
155. Id. at 15 (“Over 60 facilities failed to post a list of pro bono legal services
organizations . . . . 17 facilities failed to provide detainees the option of avoiding a strip search by
choosing that a visit be ‘noncontact.’”); id. (“More than a dozen facilities failed to allow detainees
in disciplinary segregation access to legal visits.”); id. at 27 (finding, based on American Bar
Association (ABA) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports,
that thirty facilities did not provide a reasonable degree of privacy for legal phone calls, thirtytwo facilities failed to allow detainees to make special access calls, and nineteen facilities did not
have a system in place for taking emergency phone messages).
156. Id. at 21–22 (according to ABA and UNHCR reports, forty-one facilities failed to
provide detainees the minimum amount of recreation time; nineteen facilities had no outdoor
programs; six facilities lacked an indoor recreation program; one facility provided neither outdoor
nor indoor recreation programs; and eighteen facilities provided recreation areas that could not
accommodate all detainees).
157. Id. at 46.
158. Id. at 49 (according to ICE, eleven facilities imposed one or more of the following
sanctions against detention policies: corporal punishment; deprivation of food, exercise, clothing,
or personal hygiene items; and withholding of correspondence privileges). According to
independent reviewers, impermissible and retaliatory discipline was a common problem and
violations included: deprivation of recreation and library time, deprivation of hygiene items, and
use of corporal punishment, including shackling. Id.
159. GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.04(2)(b), (d), (e).
160. See Nina Bernstein, Officials Hid Truth of Immigrant Deaths in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9,
2010, at A1 (discussing numerous incidents where immigrants died or suffered horrendous abuse
in detention and how officials covered up the details of such incidents).
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depression161 and the high number of documented suicides indicate
that immigrants in detention do not receive the appropriate level of
physical and psychological care that they require.162
The true extent of these problems and abuses is largely
unknown. The government has maintained a “deliberate policy of
opaqueness” with respect to the results of facility audits.163 ICE has
refused to release the results of its annual reviews, and the only two
agencies that have been permitted to conduct their own audits, the
American Bar Association (ABA) and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), have gained access to the
facilities on the condition that their findings remain confidential.164
2. The Privatization of Human Suffering
Additionally, the lack of regulatory oversight is even more
dangerous due to the privatization of many detention centers. As
indicated above, ICE relies heavily on private companies to provide
staff, management, and supervision to immigration detention
facilities. In fact, the majority of detainees (51 percent) are
distributed between seventeen densely populated “mega-jail”165
facilities, and more than 37 percent of all detainees are held in

161. See Lisa A. Cahan, Constitutional Protections of Aliens: A Call for Action to Provide
Adequate Health Care for Immigration Detainees, 3 J. OF HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 343, 365
n.96 (noting that 86 percent of asylum-seekers in detention suffer from high levels of depression);
see also Mukhopadhyay, supra note 112, at 709–10 (noting that conservative estimates from ICE
estimate that at least 15 percent of the general detainee population suffer from depression and
other mental illnesses).
162. Mukhopadhyay, supra note 112, at 709–10.
163. TUMLIN, supra note 23, at vi.
164. Id. at 1 (noting that ABA and UNHCR audit results are shared with ICE only). Pieces of
the ABA and UNHCR audits have recently become available to the public pursuant to courtordered discovery. Id. at 2 (“This information was released only as a result of court-ordered
discovery in Orantes-Hernandez v. Holder.”). However, the government withheld a substantial
amount of the information that it was ordered to turn over. Id. (“[The government] withheld
information on detention facilities’ compliance with 20 of the 38 national detention
standards . . . . The government also failed to produce all facility reviews conducted by ICE
during 2004 and 2005, despite the court order to do so . . . . [I]t became clear that ICE had
withheld facility reviews for at least 133 facilities that it reviewed in 2004 and 2005.”).
165. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS: SEEKING PROTECTION,
FINDING PRISON 25 (2009), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/090429-RP-hrfasylum-detention-report.pdf (noting that these detention centers have been described as “megajails”).
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facilities managed by private contractors.166 Only two mega-jails are
directly managed by localities.167 Because private contractors play a
significant role in the daily operation of detention facilities, the goals
of the detention system have become intertwined with those of a forprofit business enterprise.168 This confusion is exacerbated because
the companies are not constrained by binding regulation but instead
have great discretion over how they conduct their businesses.169
Accordingly, under both the old detention standards and the new
PBNDS, compliance is largely self-monitored by the companies
running the facilities—companies that often have their eyes on
turning a profit.170 The ramifications of using an “honor system” to
regulate the behavior of profit-driven companies are readily
apparent.
A private detention company, like any other business, faces
incentives to increase its profit margin.171 When profit margins cause
a detention company to cut corners and save costs, that leads to
substandard care and serious infringements of detainees’ rights.172 In
fact, independent agency reviews of detention facilities indicated
“widespread and severe” violations of the national detention
standards,173 yet ICE consistently overlooked the reports and granted
166. KERWIN & LIN, supra note 21, at 14–15 (demonstrating that 12,159 of the 32,000
detainees held in mega-jail facilities—or 37.99 percent—are detained in facilities managed by
private contractors).
167. Id.
168. See Robert Koulish, Blackwater and the Privatization of Immigration Control, 20 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 462, 489 (2007) (“[T]he privatization of immigration control also further
diminishes chances for individual and social redress against an increasingly tyrannical system that
is fueled by turning taxpayer revenue into corporate profits.”).
169. Id. at 473 (“Consider a field of law in which officials may gather and use secret
evidence, expedited removals, no review of final orders of removal, mandatory and indefinite
detention, secretive changes of venue, exorbitant bonds, restricted access to counsel and restricted
judicial review. Now consider the privatization of this process where employees . . . have nearly
unchecked discretion to decide the fate of asylum applicants and immigrants at our borders.”).
170. Private detention is a lucrative business. See Mukhopadhyay, supra note 112, at 702–03.
The two largest corporations behind the detention business are GEO Group and Corrections
Corporation of America, and they can charge the government anywhere from $30 million to
$60 million a year to run a single facility. Id.
171. Donna Red Wing, Every Prisoner a Profit Centre: Every Immigrant a Business
Opportunity, OPENDEMOCRACY (Sept. 29, 2010, 1:43 PM), http://www.opendemocracy.net/
donna-red-wing/every-prisoner-profit-centre-every-immigrant-business-opportunity-1 (“As in any
big business, the profit motive rules.”).
172. Mukhopadhyay, supra note 112, at 703 (“[T]he high cost of detention results in high
profits for private corporations who are able to cut corners in detainee treatment.”).
173. TUMLIN, supra note 23, at viii.
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the companies tremendous discretion to regulate themselves.174
Through ICE’s willingness to turn a blind eye to documented
violations of its own standards, the government has sent a dangerous
message to detention companies that “noncompliance carries no real
penalty.”175
One might expect these defects in the detention system to be
counterbalanced by unassailably constitutional pre-detention
procedures. But, as will be demonstrated below, this is far from the
case.
IV. PREVENTIVE DETENTION
CANNOT PERSIST
WITHOUT PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
As indicated above, immigration detention is preventive
detention, and yet none of the usual preventive-detention safeguards
apply. Although all of the procedural protections advanced in
Salerno seem equally probative in the context of immigration
detention, this part will focus on the importance of adversarial
hearings and time constraints on the duration of detention. These two
protections not only inhere in most, if not all, preventive detention
schemes apart from immigration detention but they seem to be the
hallmark of constitutionally sound civil detention.176
Preventive detention ceases to be preventive when there is
nothing to prevent. Accordingly, there should be an individualized
assessment to determine whether or not the government’s interest is
even implicated, before an immigrant is locked away. Furthermore,
there should be limitations on the length of detention because, as the
Supreme Court indicated in Salerno, when detention becomes
prolonged and thus excessive in relation to the state interest, the
nature of the detention changes from civil (and constitutional) to
punitive (and unconstitutional).177

174. Id. at 12.
175. Id. at 1.
176. In addition, some of the other protections—for instance the notion that the conditions of
confinement should reflect the state’s regulatory purpose and the mandate that detainees should
not be intermingled with the criminal population—are incorporated into Part III of this Article,
supra, as part of a critique of the current conditions of confinement.
177. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 n.4 (1987).
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As will be demonstrated in Part V, there is no principled
justification for discarding these two protections when it comes to
immigration detention. This is especially true given that the courts
have recently bestowed greater due process rights on immigrants178
and have pulled in the reins on the government’s plenary power over
immigration issues.179
A. Detaining Persons Without
Individualized Hearings Is Unconstitutional
Currently, immigrants who are subject to mandatory detention
are detained without any assessment as to whether they are
dangerous or likely to abscond.180 In other words, they are detained
without an assessment as to whether their confinement furthers state
interests. Instead, the system essentially presupposes that every
immigrant who is subject to mandatory detention is either dangerous
or a flight risk, or both.181 However, some immigrants who are placed
in removal proceedings are neither dangerous nor likely to
abscond.182 Detaining these individuals, when it is not in the
government’s interest to do so, arbitrarily deprives them of their
fundamental right to liberty.
Individualized hearings are necessary because not all removable
immigrants are dangerous.183 Some immigrants who face mandatory
detention have never been convicted of a crime, and thus the
government has no reason to automatically presume that they pose a

178. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690, 701 (2001) (indicating that a statute
authorizing indefinite detention would violate noncitizens’ constitutional rights, and holding that
a statute authorizing post-removal order detention included an implicit reasonableness limitation
of six months); see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386–87 (2005) (extending the right to
be free from indefinite post-removal order detention to inadmissible noncitizens); Tijani v. Willis,
430 F.3d 1241, 1249–50 (9th Cir. 2005) (extending the right to be free from indefinite detention
to pre-removal order detainee).
179. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 (indicating that the plenary power doctrine does not grant
the government with the authority to indefinitely detain an immigrant who has been ordered
removed but is not removable); see also Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 485 (5th Cir. 2008)
(indicating that even though a detainee had a violent criminal history and suffered from a mental
condition that increased the likelihood of future dangerousness, the government’s plenary powers
do not authorize a continued detention on these grounds when removal is not foreseeable).
180. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003).
181. See id. at 528–31.
182. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 208–09 (1953); supra
Part I.
183. See supra Part I.
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danger to their communities.184 Even when detention is based on past
criminal conduct, the types of crimes that trigger mandatory
detention do not always correlate with future danger.185 A broad
swath of criminal charges trigger mandatory detention,186 and each
charge is not necessarily probative of an immigrant’s propensity for
violence.187 For example, the triggering offense might be a
misdemeanor, a relatively minor traffic offense, or a nonviolent
crime, such as money laundering.188
In contrast, in Salerno, the Bail Reform Act authorized detention
only when a person committed a “crime of violence.”189 The fact that
the Act only authorized preventive detention when the arrestee was
charged with a “crime of violence” supplied an important link
between the individual detainee and the state interest, because the
Act only applied when what the person did increased the probability
that the person would endanger his or her community.190
Notwithstanding this correlation, the arrestee was still entitled to an
adversarial hearing.191
In the immigration context, not only is the link between the act
that triggers mandatory detention and the governmental purpose for
the detention more tenuous but there are no additional procedural
safeguards in place. Although removal of nonviolent criminal
immigrants may serve legitimate policy objectives, the mere
existence of a criminal conviction alone is not enough to justify
detention. Thus, because there is no automatic correlation between
the offenses that trigger mandatory detention and the government’s

184. See Shaughnessy, 345 U.S. at 208–09.
185. See Shalini Bhargava, Detaining Due Process: The Need for Procedural Reform in
“Joseph” Hearings After Demore v. Kim, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 51, 53 (2006)
(noting that Congress, through the mandatory detention statutes, created an irrebuttable
presumption of dangerousness and risk of flight, and arguing that this presumption is dubious in
light of the crimes that trigger mandatory detention).
186. Id. at 58 (noting that a wide range of criminal offenses—money laundering, theft
offenses, receiving a firearm through interstate commerce while being an unlawful user of
controlled substances, trafficking in vehicles, offenses related to perjury, and passport
mutilation—qualify as aggravated felonies for purposes of mandatory detention) (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(A), (D), (G), (P), (R), (S) (2000); id. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii) (2002)).
187. See Bhargava, supra note 185.
188. Id. at 58.
189. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750–51, 755 (1987).
190. Id. at 739.
191. Id. at 755.
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interest in protecting the public, individualized hearings must be
utilized.
Similarly, without an assessment as to whether the immigrant
poses a flight risk, there is no way to tell whether detention is
necessary to ensure that an immigrant shows up to his or her removal
hearings or whether a less invasive and less expensive alternative,
such as release on parole, could accomplish the same goal. Certain
groups of noncitizens are inherently less likely to abscond, and thus
their detention, unless it is based on dangerousness, is unnecessary.192
For instance, a lawful permanent resident with a job, a family, and
strong ties to his community does not pose a significant risk of
flight.193 Asylum-seekers are also highly unlikely to abscond and skip
their removal hearings because, by seeking asylum, they are
voluntarily submitting themselves to the administrative process.
Vinodbhai Patel’s story, discussed above, exemplifies the
injustice in detaining nondangerous individuals who pose no real
flight risk. The INS detained Mr. Patel for almost a year during
removal proceedings, despite his having strong social and family ties
that seemed to mitigate any danger of flight.194 Nondangerous
persons like Mr. Patel, who are unlikely to run away and subvert the
administrative process because of their legitimate legal status and
their strong community ties, should not be placed in detention.
In Demore v. Kim195 the majority challenged this conclusion by
pointing to a study that found that more than 20 percent of deportable
criminal aliens released on bond failed to show up to removal
hearings.196 From this statistic, the Court drew the conclusion that it
is constitutionally permissible to detain all immigrants as a
prophylactic measure.197 The statistic, however, was misleading.198 As
192. See, e.g., Renee Feltz, Feds Push Detention Reforms Amid Record Number of
Deportations, NEED TO KNOW ON PBS (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-toknow/security/feds-push-detention-reforms-amid-record-number-of-deportations/4341/
(“[D]etention remains the norm for immigrants brought into custody after living in the United
States, even those who have children or family ties here that make them less of a flight risk.”).
193. See Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 4, Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2001)
(No. 01-2398), abrogated by Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
194. Id. at 5–6.
195. 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
196. Id. at 519–20 (stating that detention is needed in order to avoid an “unacceptable rate of
flight”).
197. Id. at 531.
198. See id. at 563–64 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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the dissent pointed out, the data were based on a test study in
response to overcrowding.199 This overcrowding forced ICE to
haphazardly release a percentage of immigrants on bail.200 ICE paid
no attention to individual circumstances, such as whether the
immigrant had strong ties to the community, a job, a family, or a
history of absconding.201 Thus, the persons who were released were
not necessarily persons who posed low risks of flight. It is fair to
presume that had ICE conducted assessments and released only those
who were favorable candidates, far fewer noncitizens would have
absconded.
In fact, the dissent pointed to a more recent study that found that
92 percent of criminal aliens who were released under supervisory
conditions actually attended all of their hearings.202 The institute that
conducted the study applied various screening criteria, such as
strength of family and community ties, before selecting candidates
for release, thereby simulating the type of procedure that would
likely be used if ICE were to implement individualized hearings.203
In any event, the fact that a portion of immigrants will abscond
does not authorize the government to detain all immigrants without
any assessment.204 In 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit made this point when it held that the government violated due
process by mandatorily detaining a noncitizen without making an
individualized determination of his risk of flight or danger to the
community.205 The court reasoned that even if 90 percent of released
noncitizens would abscond during the removal process, it is
nevertheless unjust to imprison the 10 percent who would dutifully
report to their hearings.206

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 565.
203. Id. at 520 n.5 (majority opinion); id. at 565 n.21 (Souter, J., dissenting).
204. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
205. Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 314 (3d Cir. 2001), abrogated by Demore v. Kim, 538
U.S. 510 (2003).
206. Id. at 311–13.

Summer 2011] PREVENTIVE DETENTION DISTORTED

1507

The current immigration detention system is extremely
clumsy.207 All immigrants who are subject to expedited removal are
lumped into one category: persons who are dangerous or likely to
abscond.208 But, without an individualized determination, it is
impossible to know which immigrants are dangerous or likely to
abscond. As one lower court pointed out, “The requirement of an
individualized hearing would infuse the detention process with the
accuracy and precision that it currently lacks.”209 As it stands now,
the system deprives many individuals of their fundamental right to
freedom without furthering any government goal.210
B. Without Parameters on the Length of Detention,
Detention Can Become Excessively
Prolonged and Unconstitutional
Time limits are important because immigration detention can
last for months or even years.211 The Supreme Court has consistently
held that prolonged detention raises constitutional concerns because
when detention becomes excessive in light of the state interest, it
ceases to be constitutional.212 Accordingly, the Court has struck down
statutes for authorizing detention if the detention lacks an obvious
termination point.213 Yet, the Court has failed to recognize that
immigration detention is also without an obvious termination point
and, in many instances, is excessive in light of its administrative
purpose.214
207. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 550 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“We stressed [in Salerno] that the
act was not a ‘scattershot attempt to incapacitate those who are merely suspected of’ serious
offenses.” (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987))).
208. See supra Part II.A.1.
209. Patel, 275 F.3d at 312.
210. Id.; see Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 546–47 (1952); Singh v. Mule, No. 07-CV6387-CJS-VEB, 2009 WL 204618, at *6–7 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2009).
211. See, e.g., Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (ordering the
release of an asylum-seeker who had been detained for almost five years despite having prevailed
at every level of review and having never been charged of any crime); see also CONSTITUTION
PROJECT, supra note 17, at 13 (indicating that immigrants are often detained for months,
sometimes even years).
212. See, e.g., Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 n.4.
213. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001).
214. See CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 24 (“Although the Supreme Court has
concluded that mandatory detention does not violate due process, that conclusion is based in part
on the assumption that non-citizens in removal proceedings will be detained only for a ‘limited
period.’ In reality, however, non-citizens are often detained for weeks or months, and some are
even in detention for years.” (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003))).
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The Court’s misperception can be attributed to misleading
statistics.215 Government-reported statistics on detention lengths are
not comprehensive due to systemic inadequacies of ICE’s tracking
system, which is the source of the raw numbers behind the
statistics.216 The current tracking system allows some immigrants to
fall through the cracks.217 These immigrants are never counted for
purposes of data collection, yet their detentions drag on.218
Furthermore, statistics about the average length of detention are often
skewed because the data include stipulated removals.219 Immigrants
who waive their right to go before a judge in order to expedite the
removal process are obviously detained for a much shorter duration;
indeed, that is the incentive.220 Stipulated removals, therefore,
artificially draw down the average length of detention with respect to
those who do decide to stay and challenge their removals.
In 2003, in Demore v. Kim, Justice Souter, writing for the
dissent, criticized the majority for using similarly skewed statistical
data to support its contention that detention is generally of a short
duration.221 Justice Souter believed that the statute authorizing
mandatory detention of criminal aliens violated due process in part
because removal proceedings have no deadline and may last more
than a year.222 The majority, however, found that the detention was
215. See Kimere Jane Kimball, Note, A Right to Be Heard: Non-citizens’ Due Process Right
to In-Person Hearings to Justify Their Detentions Pursuant to Removal, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L.
159, 161 (2009) (noting that the Demore decision has received criticism because the majority
relied on statistics regarding detention length that included people who chose immediate
deportation).
216. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 77 (“The
detainee tracking system, for five of the eight ICE facilities tested, did not always contain timely
information. . . . At six of eight ICE detention facilities tested, [the Deportable Alien Control
System] and detention facility records did not always agree on the location of detainees, or
contained information showing the detainee had been deported.”).
217. Mukhopadhyay, supra note 112, at 704 (citing Amy Golstein & Dana Priest, Careless
Detention: Medical Care in Immigrant Prisons, WASH. POST (SPECIAL SERIES), May 11–14,
2008) (noting that many detainees slip through the cracks due to lack of representation or family
to whom they can stay connected while in detention; thus, it is highly likely that some detainees
have been in detention considerably longer than those in any of the publicized cases).
218. See id.
219. Brief for T. Alexander Aleinikoff et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Demore
v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (No. 011491), 2002 WL 31455523, at *3 (“[T]he median period of
detention is misleading [sic] skewed as it is by the large number of detained aliens who concede
deportability, do not apply for relief from removal and are promptly removed.”).
220. See supra Part III.A.3.
221. Demore, 538 U.S. at 567–68 (Souter, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 558.
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not excessive because detentions, in most cases, lasted around fortyseven days.223 The dissent pointed out that the majority relied on
statistics that inaccurately portrayed the length of immigration
detention.224 The forty-seven-day average counted from the time an
immigrant received charging documents to the time of decision.225 It
did not, therefore, capture the weeks or months that an immigrant
can spend in detention before receiving charging documents.226
Indeed, the MPI study discussed in Part II found that the average
length of detention for pre-removal detainees was eighty-one days,227
a conservative estimate given that the snapshot data were based on
persons who remained in custody after the study concluded.
Moreover, several circuit courts, faced with the question of
whether detention in nonimmigration contexts has become prolonged
and thus unconstitutional, conduct a case-by-case analysis in which
they consider the strength of the state’s evidence indicating that the
detainee poses a risk of flight or danger to the community.228
However, if this balancing were applied to immigrants in detention,
it seems that even a comparatively short time in detention would be
considered prolonged. The state, having never conducted an
individualized assessment, would have no evidence at all indicating
that the immigrant poses a risk of flight or danger. Accordingly,
because detention can become excessively prolonged in relation to
its administrative purpose, immigration detention should be subject
to stringent time limitations.

223. Id. at 529 (majority opinion).
224. Id. at 567–68 (Souter, J., dissenting).
225. See id.
226. Id.; see also Bridget Kessler, Comment, In Jail, No Notice, No Hearing . . . No Problem?
A Closer Look at Immigration Detention and the Due Process Standards of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 571, 573–76 (2009) (describing
story of young Peruvian mother who was seven months pregnant when she was detained, who
waited in detention for almost two months before she received her charging documents).
227. KERWIN & LIN, supra note 21, at 16.
228. See United States v. Hare, 873 F.2d 796, 801 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Like other circuits, we
find that the due-process limit on the duration of preventive detention requires assessment on a
case-by-case basis . . . . [A] court must consider . . . the strength of the government’s proof that
the defendant poses a risk of flight or a danger to the community.” (citations omitted)).
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V. REBUTTING JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR THE CURRENT
IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM
Given the importance of the two protections discussed above
and the fact that they are extended in other preventive detention
contexts, it is puzzling that they do not apply to immigration
detention. Some have defended the current detention system on the
grounds that noncitizens are not entitled to due process,229 or at least
not the same level of due process that is afforded to citizens.230
Others insist that immigration law is at the zenith of the
government’s plenary power.231 Accordingly, Congress and the
executive branch have virtually unbridled discretion to make
immigration decisions.232 The next section entertains each of these
justifications and then shows why they fail. As a result, there is no
principled justification for the absence of Salerno-type protections in
the context of preventive detention as used in immigration removal
proceedings.
A. Illegal Immigrants and Removable
Noncitizens Are Entitled to Due Process
Some defend the current immigration detention system on
grounds that illegal immigrants or removable noncitizens are not
entitled to due process.233 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment prohibits the government from unfairly depriving

229. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 692 (“The Government argues that, from a
constitutional perspective, alien status itself can justify indefinite detention.”).
230. Id.
231. See, e.g., id. at 695 (“The Government also looks for support to cases holding that
Congress has ‘plenary power’ to create immigration law, and that the Judicial Branch must defer
to Executive and Legislative Branch decision making in that area.”).
232. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J 545, 546–47 (1990)
(describing a case involving an influx of Haitians seeking asylum in south Florida).
233. See, e.g., Gisbert v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1443 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding
that continued detention of excludable aliens did not violate due process because the aliens had no
liberty interest in being paroled); see also Maria V. Morris, The Exit Fiction: Unconstitutional
Indefinite Detention of Deportable Aliens, 23 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 255, 278–80 (2001) (describing
the theory that once an immigrant no longer has a right to remain in the United States, he or she
can be expelled according to whatever process Congress mandates); id. at 275 (noting that under
the entry fiction doctrine, immigration officials could parole a person into the United States
without that person being considered to have entered the country for the purpose of constitutional
due process protection).
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persons of fundamental rights,234 including the right to be free from
imprisonment, detention, or other forms of physical restraint.235 The
Supreme Court has held that government detention violates due
process unless it is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate
procedural protections236 or in special nonpunitive situations237 where
extenuating circumstances, such as a harm-threatening mental
illness, outweigh the individual’s constitutionally protected liberty
interest.238 As demonstrated above, immigration detention is not so
narrowly tailored. Some have tried to justify this anomaly on
grounds that due process guarantees simply do not extend to illegal
immigrants.239 The logic goes: if an immigrant is removable, and thus
does not have a right to be in the country, then the immigrant is not
entitled to the protections that the Constitution affords.240 This
position is in discord with both the language of the Due Process
Clause and the decisions of the Supreme Court.
The Due Process Clause forbids the government from depriving
any person of life or liberty without due process of law.241 This
language indicates that the protection applies to all persons inside the
country, not only to citizens.242 Indeed, this is how the courts have
interpreted the Fifth Amendment. In 1976, in Mathews v. Diaz,243 the
Supreme Court stated that even unlawful aliens are entitled to Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment protections.244 In 2001, in Zadvydas v.
Davis,245 a landmark case that will be revisited below, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed this principle, stating, “Once an alien enters the
234. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 942 (2010) (discussing “constitutionally
protected interests” as “fundamental rights”).
235. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992) (“Freedom from physical restraint
being a fundamental right, the State must have a particularly convincing reason, which it has not
put forward, for such discrimination against insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally ill.”).
236. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
237. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80.
238. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356–57 (1997).
239. See Morris, supra note 233, at 279 (discussing the argument, advanced by some courts,
that because excludable and deportable aliens have no right to be at large in the United States,
they are not entitled to due process protection).
240. Id.
241. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
242. Id.
243. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
244. Id. at 77–79; see Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 409 (6th Cir. 2003).
245. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
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country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause
applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens,
whether their presence is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or
permanent.”246 Finally, in 2003, in Demore v. Kim,247 the dissent once
again echoed this point, insisting that “[i]t has been settled for over a
century that all aliens within our territory are ‘persons’ entitled to the
protection of the Due Process Clause.”248
The courts have been more reluctant to recognize the due
process rights of aliens who have not legally entered the country.249
Such rights, when they come to fruition, tend to be limited.250 For
example, in 2005, the Supreme Court, in Clark v. Martinez,251
extended its holding in Zadvydas to benefit aliens who have not
entered the country, but it also suggested that the same constitutional
concerns were not necessarily at play due to the immigrant’s
inadmissible status.252 Although inadmissible aliens may be entitled
to less process, this does not mean that they receive no due process
protections at all.253 A Sixth Circuit court pointed out, quite tellingly,
that “[i]f excludable aliens were not protected by even the
substantive component of constitutional due process . . . we do not
see why the United States government could not torture or
summarily execute them.”254
246. Id. at 679 (emphasis added).
247. 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
248. Id. at 543 (Souter, J., dissenting).
249. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212–15 (1953); see also
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682 (pointing out that aliens who have not yet gained initial admission, in
contrast with those who have been admitted and are subsequently ordered removed, “present a
very different question”).
250. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 (1976) (“The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens
alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further conclusion that all
aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship or, indeed, to the conclusion that all
aliens must be placed in a single homogeneous legal classification.”); see also Shaughnessy, 345
U.S. at 212 (stating that “an alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing”
than an alien who has “passed through our gates”); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process
as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.” (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S.
651, 659–60 (1892))).
251. 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
252. Id. at 380.
253. Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 410 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The fact that excludable
aliens are entitled to less process . . . does not mean that they are not at all protected by the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
254. Id.
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Mandatory detention therefore cannot be justified on due
process grounds. Even if one class of immigrants does not have fullfledged due process rights, the Court has held that other immigrants
do have significant due process rights. Yet mandatory detention
treats all of these immigrants the same.255
B. Plenary Power Doctrine Does Not
Legitimize the Current Immigration Detention System
Others have defended the current immigration detention system
by pointing to the plenary power doctrine.256 Proponents of this
justification assert that the plenary power doctrine gives Congress
great latitude to define the categories of admission, exclusion, and
deportation.257 Under this view, “[i]f Congress believes that prior
criminal convictions predict future dangerousness or flight risk” then
Congress may, pursuant to its plenary power, “legislate that
presumption.”258 There are two criticisms of this viewpoint.
1. Distinguishing Between the
Power to Remove and the Power to Detain
First, there is a fundamental difference between the
government’s power to exclude and its power to detain.259 Although
the plenary power doctrine gives Congress broad discretion over
decisions pertaining to issues of admission and exclusion, it does not
provide the government carte blanche to detain.260 Clearly, the
authority to detain is a corollary of Congress’s removal power.261
When detention is incidental to effectuating removal, Congress does
not, however, have unbridled discretion to detain simply by virtue of

255. See supra Part II.A.1.
256. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603–07 (1889) (holding that the
federal government has plenary power to regulate admission and exclusion of noncitizens
pursuant to its sovereignty); see also Bhargava, supra note 185, at 63 (citing Chae Chan Ping,
130 U.S. at 603–07) (noting how some defend the detention system on grounds that Congress has
significant latitude pursuant to the plenary power doctrine).
257. Bhargava, supra note 185, at 63.
258. Id.
259. Id. (“[I]ssues of admission and exclusion are different from those of detention, and
Congress’s plenary power over the former does not—and should not—presuppose a similar
power over the latter.” (citing Cole, supra note 85, at 1038–39)).
260. Id.
261. Id.
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its broad power to remove, for the two powers are not coextensive.262
That is, the former—detention—is not always necessary to achieve
the latter—removal.263
Moreover, conditions of detention, as indicated above, must
comport with due process.264 The power to detain, therefore, is
subject to constitutional constraints that do not bind the
government’s power to remove. As such, detention falls within the
government’s plenary power only when special circumstances
require it, namely, when a removable person poses a risk of flight or
danger.265
2. Limits on Congress’s Plenary Power over Immigration
Second, plenary power is not boundless.266 The Supreme Court
has placed important limitations on the doctrine.267 For instance, in
Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court used statutory interpretation
to draw a very clear and important line, effectively placing an
expiration date on the government’s plenary power.268 Zadvydas, a
resident alien, was ordered deported based on his criminal record, but
the government failed to remove him during the ninety-day removal
period because no country was willing to accept him.269 Zadvydas
filed a habeas petition seeking release on grounds that the
government could not detain him indefinitely.270 In 2001, in a
landmark decision, the Supreme Court held that the post-removal
order detention statute did not authorize indefinite detention but
contained an implicit reasonableness time limitation.271 The Court set
the permissible length of post-removal order detention at six months,
at which point the immigrant must be released unless the government
262. Id. at 65–66.
263. See supra Part IV.A.
264. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (stating that Congress’s plenary power
is subject to constitutional limitations).
265. See Bhargava, supra note 185, at 65.
266. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700–01.
267. Bhargava, supra note 185, at 63–64; see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700–01.
268. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699 (interpreting “the statute to avoid a serious constitutional
threat” and placing a six-month time limit on post-removal order detention).
269. Id. at 684–85.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 682 (“Based on our conclusion that indefinite detention . . . would raise serious
constitutional concerns, we construe the statute to contain an implicit ‘reasonable time’
limitation . . . .”).
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can show that there is a significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.272
The Zadvydas decision is significant because it places
parameters on the government’s plenary power. The Court made it
clear that the government’s interest in securing removal—an interest
that is at the core of its plenary power—at some point must yield to
the alien’s due process rights, even when the alien no longer has any
claim to remain in the country.273
While the Court in Zadvydas did not find a constitutional
violation, it construed the federal statute so as to save it from
constitutional attack.274 The Court reasoned, “A statute permitting
indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional
problem,” and so it chose to read a “reasonable time” limitation into
the statute.275 Although the Court formally based its holding on
statutory interpretation, the decision had the effect of placing a
constitutional check on the government’s plenary power.
In fact, the Supreme Court has been placing limits on plenary
power for years.276 In 1952, the Court clearly stated that it would be
unconstitutional to assume that every alien facing removal is
dangerous.277 In Carlson v. Landon,278 four communist aliens were
detained without bail pending a decision of their deportability.279 The
Court upheld their detention on grounds that the Attorney General
had sufficient reason to believe that releasing the communist aliens
during the removal process could endanger the welfare or safety of
the country.280 While it acknowledged that detention can be a
necessary part of the removal process, the Court cautioned that
“purpose to injure could not be imputed generally to all aliens
subject to deportation.”281 Thus, the Court held that the statute, which
gave the Attorney General discretion to detain, was constitutional
272. Id. at 701.
273. Id. at 689–90.
274. Id. (noting that, as a cardinal principle of statutory interpretation, the Court must first
determine whether a fair construction of the statute can avoid the constitutional question).
275. Id. at 682, 690.
276. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952).
277. Id.
278. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
279. Id. at 528–29.
280. Id. at 541–42.
281. Id. at 538.
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precisely because it did not presume that all deportable aliens were
dangerous.282
Although more than fifty years ago the Court recognized that it
would be impermissible to sweep all immigrants into detention based
on generalized presumptions, this is what the government does
today. Given that due process rights do apply to immigrants, and
given that the government does not have unlimited plenary power,
the procedural protections identified in Salerno and its progeny
should apply in the context of immigration detention. In fact, recent
case law casts even greater doubt on the plenary power and no-dueprocess justifications for the current immigration detention system.283
The Supreme Court and several lower courts have recently extended
immigrants’ due process rights284 and have placed boundaries on the
government’s plenary power.285
C. Trend Toward More Due Process
Rights and Greater Limits on Plenary Power
In the wake of Zadvydas, courts have imposed greater
limitations on preventive detention as a tool in immigration removal
proceedings.286 This trend creates an even stronger argument for
rejecting the proposed justifications for the current system. The move
toward greater due process rights and restrictions on plenary power is
illustrated by the manner in which lower courts have faithfully

282. Id. at 541–42.
283. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 371–72 (2005) (“[N]othing in Zadvydas
indicates that § 1231(a)(6) authorizes detention until it approaches constitutional limits. Nor does
§ 1182(d)(5) independently authorize continued detention of these aliens.”); Tuan Thai v.
Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 790, 798 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We do not believe that Zadvydas can properly be
read to prohibit the indefinite detention of dangerous resident aliens like Ma, while allowing the
indefinite detention of dangerous resident aliens like Thai.”).
284. See, e.g., Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[D]ue process
requires ‘adequate procedural protections’ to ensure that the government’s asserted justification
for physical confinement ‘outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in
avoiding physical restraint.’” (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91 (2001))).
285. See, e.g., Singh v. Mule, No. 07-CV-6387-CJS-VEB, 632009 WL 204618, at *5–7
(W.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2009) (holding that DHS/ICE could not detain the petitioner, an Indian
national and an alien, since DHS/ICE failed to demonstrate that it was significantly likely that the
petitioner would be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future).
286. See, e.g., Tuan Thai, 366 F.3d at 792 (concluding that the Supreme Court’s statutory
interpretation of section 1231(a)(6) does not allow “for the indefinite detention of an alien under
special circumstances, such as the existence of a mental illness which makes the alien a danger to
the community”).
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followed Zadvydas287 and by the way that subsequent rulings have
extended it.288
1. Lower Courts Faithfully Apply Zadvydas
Several lower courts have followed Zadvydas and ordered the
government to release detained immigrants, even in cases where
detention is strongly in the government’s interest.289 For example, in
Tuan Thai v. Ashcroft,290 the Ninth Circuit held that the six-month
limit on post-removal order detention controlled, even though the
alien posed a significant danger to the community.291 After entering
the United States, Tuan Thai was convicted of assault, harassment,
and third-degree rape.292 Nevertheless, the court held that the
authorizing statute, as it was interpreted in Zadvydas, did not contain
an exception for particularly dangerous individuals.293 The court
pointed out that the state could use supervised parole or involuntary
civil commitment as a way to abate the risk that Thai posed to the
public.294
In 2008, in Tran v. Mukasey,295 the Fifth Circuit also applied the
Zadvydas six-month rule despite the government’s contention that
there should be an exception for violent, mentally-ill detainees.296 Ha
Tran, like Tuan Thai, had a well-documented history of violence and
mental illness.297 He spent two years in a mental hospital, followed
by six months in a halfway house, and then murdered his wife the
day after he was released.298 Nevertheless, the court held that the
government did not have the authority to detain Tran beyond the six287. See id.
288. See, e.g., Clark, 543 U.S. at 378–79, 386 (applying a strict interpretation of the Zadvydas
test).
289. See, e.g., Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 479 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that continued
detention of an alien beyond the ninety-day removal period was unacceptable despite the alien’s
mental illness); Tuan Thai, 366 F.3d at 792 (holding that an alien should not be detained even
though he may possess ill mental health and a criminal history).
290. 366 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2004).
291. Tuan Thai, 366 F.3d at 792.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 797–98.
294. Id. at 799.
295. 515 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2008).
296. Id. 482–83.
297. Id. at 480.
298. Id.
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month mark, given that removal was unlikely in the near future.299
Agreeing with the Ninth Circuit, the court reasoned that it is of no
consequence whether a detained immigrant poses a risk to the public,
even a grave risk, because such a finding does not change the
constitutional analysis.300 The six-month rule from Zadvydas does not
include an exception for dangerousness.301
These cases illustrate the decisive boundary that the Supreme
Court drew in Zadvydas. The government has an obvious interest in
protecting the public from repeat violent offenders, rapists, and
murderers, especially when offenders have documented mental
illnesses that increase the risk of future dangerousness. However,
even when the government has a compelling reason to keep an
immigrant detained, detention must still be reasonable.302 That is to
say, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable at the six-month mark,
then the immigrant’s interest in liberty trumps the government’s
interest in continuing to detain the immigrant, regardless of how
compelling this interest may be.303
Courts have also interpreted and applied Zadvydas in a way that
has created an onerous burden for the state.304 Lower courts, for
instance, have required the state to show the likelihood of
effectuating removal as to the specific immigrant.305 In Singh v.
Mule,306 a citizen of India conceded his removal, but the government
could not remove him because the Indian Consulate failed to respond
to requests for travel documents.307 The court rejected the
government’s contention that it was still making a “good faith effort”
to remove Singh, and it also dismissed the government’s statisticsbased argument that DHS had repatriated many hundreds of aliens to
India in recent years.308 According to the court, what mattered was
299. Id. at 484–85.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 485.
302. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (stating that Congress must implement
its power to detain in a constitutionally permissible manner).
303. See Singh v. Mule, No. 07-CV-6387-CJS-VEB, 2009 WL 204618, at *5 (W.D.N.Y.
Jan. 27, 2009).
304. See, e.g., id.
305. Id. at *4–5.
306. Id.
307. Id. at *2–4.
308. Id. at *4–5.
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not a showing of a good faith effort or evidence that the government
could hypothetically remove immigrants to India.309 Instead, the
government needed to show that it was reasonably likely to remove
Singh, himself, in the near future.310 Given the Indian Consulate’s
protracted silence, the court held that Singh was entitled to release.311
Singh is significant because it narrows the scope of cases in
which detention beyond the six-month mark will be authorized by
increasing the government’s burden of proof.312 In order to justify
ongoing detention, the government cannot simply point to a
repatriation agreement with the immigrant’s native country or
suggest the accessibility of travel documents.313 Rather, the
government must show a real, concrete likelihood of removing the
specific immigrant in the reasonably foreseeable future.314
2. Extending Zadvydas and Moving
Toward Greater Due Process Protection
In 2005, the Supreme Court answered the question left open by
its decision in Zadvydas when it held that the six-month presumptive
limit on post-removal order detention applied not only to removable
immigrants but to inadmissible immigrants as well.315 In Clark v.
Martinez,316 the Supreme Court held that even inadmissible
immigrants who have not legally entered the country are protected
from indefinite detention.317 The Court insisted that the holding must
apply to all categories of aliens because it would not make sense to
interpret the statute to contain a reasonableness time limit as to one
class, but not the other.318 Although the Court avoided the question of
whether inadmissible immigrants are entitled to the same due process

309. Id. at *5 (“[R]espondents’ past successes in removing aliens to India did not amount to a
significant likelihood of removal of Singh in the reasonably foreseeable future.”).
310. Id.
311. Id. at *7. The case was eventually dismissed as moot as Singh was deported to India. Id.
at *7–8.
312. See id. at *4–5.
313. Id. at *5.
314. Id.
315. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378–79, 386 (2005).
316. 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
317. Id. at 378–79.
318. Id.
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rights that removable immigrants are,319 the Court’s decision signaled
an important break with past traditions.320 Historically, the
government, relying on the legal fiction of nonentrance, has given
the least number of rights and protections to immigrants found at the
border.321 Thus, Martinez represents a significant step toward greater
due process rights for all immigrants because the Supreme Court
declined to use nonentry as a reason to siphon away the due process
protections that are afforded to other classes of immigrants.
In addition, in Prieto-Romero v. Clark,322 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit extended the Zadvydas six-month limit
on post-removal order detention to another immigration statute.323
Prieto-Romero concerned section 1226(a), a statute authorizing
discretionary detention pending removal,324 whereas Zadvydas
required the Court to interpret section 1231(a)(6),325 a statute
authorizing mandatory detention for inadmissible or criminal aliens.
Nevertheless, the court applied the six-month rule from Zadvydas,
reasoning that it would be “incongruous” to conclude “that Congress
intended other detention statutes to authorize the indefinite detention
of aliens, where such detention would clearly pose . . . constitutional
concerns.”326
The Ninth Circuit has even applied the principle in Zadvydas to
pre-removal order detention.327 In Tijani v. Willis,328 the Ninth Circuit
held that an alien who was detained for two years and eight months
while awaiting a removal decision was entitled to release on bail
unless the government could establish that he posed a risk of flight or
a danger to his community.329 The court did not address the

319. Id. at 381–82.
320. For an illustration of how courts have previously restricted the due process rights of
immigrants stopped at the border, see Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,
212, 214–16 (1953). See also supra note 250 (listing cases that discuss limitations on due process
rights of aliens who have not legally entered the country).
321. See supra note 250.
322. 534 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2008).
323. Id. at 1062–63.
324. Id. at 1057.
325. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001).
326. Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1063.
327. See Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1242 (9th Cir. 2005).
328. 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005).
329. Id. at 1242.
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constitutional issues that prolonged pre-removal order detention
raised, however, because it held that the statute called for “expedited
removal,” and two years and eight months was clearly not
expeditious.330 Nevertheless, the court challenged the scope of the
plenary power doctrine, stating that “[d]espite the substantial powers
that Congress may exercise in regard to aliens, it is constitutionally
doubtful that Congress may authorize imprisonment of this duration
for lawfully admitted resident aliens who are subject to removal.”331
In Nadarajah v. Gonzales,332 the Ninth Circuit again chose to
impose Zadvydas-type time limitations on pre-removal order
detention.333 In Nadarajah, an asylum-seeker who was repeatedly
tortured in Sri Lanka was detained for nearly five years, despite
having prevailed at every level of administrative review.334 The court
insisted that this amounted to indefinite detention and rejected the
government’s argument that his detention was finite because
“someday” the Attorney General would review his case and his
detention would thereby come to an end.335 The court held that the
government is without authority, under the current detention statutes,
to detain an alien indefinitely,336 and because removal was not
reasonably foreseeable, the court called for the alien’s release.337
There is no principled justification for the immigration detention
system. The common justifications fail because immigrants do have
due process rights and the government’s plenary power to detain
them is not boundless. Moreover, several lower courts have
demonstrated a willingness to recognize even greater due process
rights and to impose more limits on the government’s plenary power,
suggesting that the time is ripe to reevaluate the immigration
detention system.

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Id.
Id.
443 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1076–78.
Id. at 1071.
Id. at 1081.
Id. at 1079.
Id. at 1082.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although Zadvydas established some protections for postremoval order detainees, the entire immigration detention system
requires comprehensive reform. The government needs to implement
procedures that are geared toward protecting pre-removal order
detainees from unconstitutional deprivations.
Pre-removal order detainees should be given more, not less,
protection than post-removal order detainees receive because preremoval order detainees may have legitimate claims to remain in the
United States.338 Post-removal order detainees’ claims have been
foreclosed, and yet they are protected from prolonged detention.339
Pre-removal order detainees, on the other hand, may have valid
claims for political asylum, their criminal offenses may not warrant
expedited removal, and they may be lawful permanent residents or
even citizens. And yet, pre-removal order detainees are not protected
from prolonged detention.340 Moreover, these individuals arguably
have more to lose because detention can interfere with their ability to
challenge their removal.341 Detention makes it more difficult for
immigrants to obtain counsel,342 it severely hinders an immigrant’s
ability to conduct legal research,343 and it interferes with an
immigrant’s access to medical and psychological services344—
services that may be critical to a successful claim.345 It is illogical that
pre-removal order detainees have fewer rights and receive fewer
protections than their post-removal order counterparts enjoy.
The traditional preventive detention safeguards should be
applied to immigration detention. At the very least, there should be
individualized hearings and strictly enforced time limits on preremoval order detention. Furthermore, in order for this to become a
constitutionally sound system, the conditions of confinement must
338. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 560–61 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that
from a constitutional standpoint, pre-removal order detainees actually have a stronger claim
against confinement than post-removal order detainees do).
339. See id.
340. See supra Parts III, IV.B.
341. Demore, 538 U.S. at 554 (Souter, J., dissenting).
342. See Brané & Lundholm, supra note 25, at 159 (citing COLE, supra note 125, at 35)
(“Statistics indicate that as many as 80% of immigration detainees are not represented . . . .”).
343. See supra Part III.A.2.
344. See supra Part III.A.3.
345. See supra Part III.A.3.

Summer 2011] PREVENTIVE DETENTION DISTORTED

1523

drastically improve so as to reflect the regulatory purpose of
immigration detention.
A. Noncitizens Should Receive
Individualized Hearings Before They Are Detained
An immigrant facing detention should receive an adversarial
hearing where an impartial party determines whether the immigrant
poses a risk of flight or a danger to his or her community. That is,
before the government drastically infringes on an immigrant’s liberty
rights, the government should have to show that detaining the
immigrant is in the government’s interest.
Currently, mandatory detention statutes permit the government
to presume that all immigrants who are subject to removal
proceedings are either dangerous or likely to abscond, despite the
fact that the offenses that trigger mandatory detention do not
necessarily suggest either a propensity for violence or a risk of
flight.346 Adversarial hearings are therefore needed in order to probe
that presumption. If the immigrant poses neither a risk of flight nor a
danger to his or her community, then detention should not be
authorized.
Using Salerno as a guide, DHS should be required to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the immigrant is
either likely to abscond or poses a danger to the community.347 The
immigrant should be given the opportunity to testify, present
witnesses, proffer evidence, and cross-examine other witnesses.
Asylum-seekers who have passed their credible-fear interview
and do not pose a danger to the public should be automatically
paroled and referred to shelters and pro bono legal clinics, where
they can receive the physical, psychological, and legal assistance that
they require.
B. Pre-Removal Order Detention
Should Be Subject to Strict Time Limits
Furthermore, there should be time constraints placed on preremoval order detention because the Court has time and again held
346. See supra Part IV.A.
347. The act in Salerno used “clear and convincing” as the burden of proof. United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987). Proof by a preponderance of the evidence would likely suffice
in the immigration context.
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that prolonged detention is unconstitutional.348 In Zadvydas, for
example, the Court indicated that prolonged detention is
unconstitutional, but it found that pre-removal order detention, unlike
post-removal order detention, is not prolonged because it has an
“obvious termination point.”349 The Court drew a similar conclusion
in Demore when it upheld the constitutionality of pre-removal order
detention without individualized hearings on grounds that preremoval order detention is “brief.”350 Had the Court appreciated the
true nature of pre-removal order detention in each case, it would
have reached the opposite conclusion. Limits on pre-removal order
detention, therefore, will fit squarely within the thrust of the
Zadvydas holding, just as soon as the Court acknowledges that preremoval order detention is anything but brief.
Some immigrants wait in pre-removal order detention for
months or even years.351 In order to address this problem, the
government should impose deadlines on pre-removal order detention,
just as it has done in the post-removal order context.352
Moreover, to remedy the lag that currently exists between the
time when a detainee is taken into custody and when he or she
receives charging papers,353 DHS should require ICE to promptly
provide detainees with charging documents within twenty-four hours
of being taken into custody. Charging papers inform detainees of the
charges against them and formally place them in removal
proceedings.354 Unbelievably, it can take months for a detainee to
receive these papers.355 Not only do such delays prolong the already
protracted removal process, but they can also prevent detainees from
accessing an immigration court for a bond hearing or petition for
habeas relief until DHS has served charging documents with the
immigration court.
348. See, e.g., Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748 n.4 (“[A]n arrestee is entitled to prompt detention
hearing.”).
349. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001); Bradley B. Banias, A “Substantial
Argument” Against Prolonged, Pre-Removal Mandatory Detention, 11 RUTGERS RACE & L.
REV. 31, 36–39 (2009).
350. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 511 (2003).
351. See id. at 558 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
352. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699.
353. See supra note 226.
354. Kessler, supra note 226, at 584–85.
355. See supra note 226.
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DHS should also establish a reasonable time frame for removal
proceedings. This article proposes that detainees receive a hearing on
the merits before an immigration judge within ninety days of
receiving charging documents.
Those who resist this model suggest that immigrants will simply
pursue “dilatory tactics” in order to run out the clock and gain
release.356 However, to alleviate this worry, the clock could simply
temporarily stop running whenever an immigrant requests a
continuance or otherwise stalls the proceedings.357
C. The Current Detention System Should Be
Overhauled so as to Improve the Conditions of Confinement
Detention will sometimes be in the government’s best interest.
Once it is determined that an immigrant is a flight risk or poses a
danger to his or her community, then that individual should enter a
detention system. However, the nature of the detention must reflect
the regulatory purpose of civil detention.
1. Immigration Detention Must Become More Civil
First of all, the government should reform the detention system
so as to create an intelligible distinction between civil custody and
penal incarceration. If immigration detainees are still to be held in
jail facilities, then they should be segregated from the criminal
population at all times. Also, staff at these facilities should be trained
to understand the differences between criminal inmates and civil
detainees, and they should be familiarized with the divergent
regulations that govern the treatment of each population,
respectively. Moreover, immigrants in detention should enjoy greater
freedom; they should be entitled to more lenient visitation privileges
and more opportunities for recreation. Immigrants in detention
should not be subjected to physical restraints unless restraints are
necessary to protect the immigrant or any other person from
immediate harm. They should also have the option of no-contact
visits in order to avoid invasive strip searches.358

356. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 24.
357. Id.
358. See Tumlin, supra note 23, at 14–15.
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On the whole, immigration detention should look more like civil
custody and less like jail.
2. Immigration Detention Facilities
Should Be Subject to Binding Regulation
Additionally, because there is currently no legitimate regulatory
oversight, the government should establish standards for detention
facilities and codify these regulations into the law. Without
enforceable rules, there is no way to hold facilities accountable when
they fail to maintain suitable detention conditions. And, as indicated
above, detention facilities have come under great scrutiny for failing
to meet even the most basic detainee needs, such as adequate food,
water, and medical care.
Binding regulation is even more important if detention remains
privatized. As discussed above, for-profit private facilities have
strong financial incentive to cut corners, which leads to substandard
detention conditions. Thus, in order to counteract this incentive,
legitimate consequences should be imposed on facilities that fail to
comply with the minimum detention standards. The facilities should
face monetary sanctions for minor violations and should lose their
contracts and be shut down entirely for major or repeated incidents
of noncompliance. Moreover, detainees must be able to initiate
litigation if a facility or its management fails to comply with the
regulations. Finally, as an additional check on the system, the
government should adopt policies in order to promote increased
transparency with respect to facility audits.
3. The Government Should
Embrace Alternatives to Detention
The government should also utilize alternatives to detention for
nondangerous immigrants who pose only a low or moderate risk of
flight. ICE currently has three alternative programs in place, but none
are available to noncitizens who are subject to mandatory
detention.359 Some advocates have suggested that conceptualizing the
alternatives as “soft” detention or “constructive custody” could make
them available to mandatory detainees.360 If mandatory detainees

359. KERWIN & LIN, supra note 21, at 31.
360. Id.
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could enter these alternative forms of custody, “the potential savings
to the government and benefits to the individuals would be
immense.”361
The three alternative programs incorporate varying degrees of
supervision and self-reporting. The programs include different
combinations of electronic monitoring, curfews, in-person reporting,
and unannounced home visits. According to ICE, it costs anywhere
from thirty cents to fifteen dollars a day to supervise an immigrant
under one of these programs.362 In contrast, it costs $141 a day to
hold an immigrant in detention.363 Not only are these alternatives less
expensive, but they also appear to work. ICE has reported that for
each of its three models, 87 percent, 96 percent, and 93 percent of
immigrants appear for their removal hearings, respectively.
DHS should consider rigorous in-home detention as an
alternative to custodial detention, especially for mandatory detainees
whose criminal records do not indicate violent tendencies.364
Alternative models, moreover, are in many instances more
appropriate, especially with respect to asylum-seekers and torture
survivors. Once asylum-seekers demonstrate that they have a
credible fear, and unless they pose a danger to the community, they
should be paroled and recommended to shelters where they can
receive the necessary physical, emotional, and legal support that they
require.
VII. CONCLUSION
“[D]ue Process requires that the nature and duration of
commitment bear some reasonable relation to purpose for which the
individual is committed.”365 Yet, Vinodbhai Patel was detained for
nearly a year despite the fact that his confinement furthered no
governmental purpose. Patel was a nonviolent entrepreneur with
strong social and family ties. He was neither a danger nor a flight
risk. Patel’s confinement, both in nature and duration, was
361. Id.
362. Id. at 32.
363. Id. at 4–5 (citing Michelle Roberts, Immigrants Face Long Detention, Few Rights,
DESERET NEWS (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705291116/Immigrantsface-long-detention-few-rights.html).
364. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 5.
365. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
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unreasonable. Had he received the same procedural protections that
inhere in all other preventive detention contexts, the
unconstitutionality of his detention would have been apparent.
The United States places hundreds of thousands of immigrants
in detention every year, at unspeakable costs to the nation as well as
to the individuals who must struggle to navigate the broken system.
Many of the immigrants who are currently clogging the detention
system are like Vinodbhai Patel—they pose neither a risk of flight,
nor a danger to their community—and yet they are stripped of their
fundamental rights and tossed into an already congested system.
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court acknowledged that noncitizens,
even those who are unlawfully present, have a powerful interest in
avoiding physical confinement, and so the Court placed a deadline
on post-removal order detention. Several lower courts have
recognized that pre-removal order detainees have at least an equal
interest, if not a greater one, in avoiding unnecessary confinement,
and the courts have thereby called for greater procedural protections.
As the dissent in Demore pointed out, “[t]hese cases yield a simple
distillate”: it is unconstitutional to mandatorily detain large groups of
immigrants without affording them any procedural safeguards.366
“Due process calls for an individual determination before someone is
locked away.”367

366. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 551 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
367. Id.

